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Prevention of Crime
Police officers on patrol often observe suspicious conduct. Since this
conduct may represent the first stages of crime, public safety often
depends on the authority of the officers to investigate and intervene.
A traditional method of intervention has been arrest for loitering or
vagrancy.' In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,2 however, the Su-
preme Court invalidated an ordinance against loitering and vagrancy.
The Court found that the law failed to give notice of the prohibited
conduct and invited arbitrary enforcement.3 After that decision, laws
permitting arrests for vagrancy and loitering have increasingly fallen
to constitutional challenge. 4
Invalidation of these laws has left a gap in the measures by which the
police officer can prevent crime. When investigation does not dispel
suspicion that a crime is about to occur, the officer needs to interrupt
the activity that gave rise to his suspicion. But he has no legal method
of intervention except arrest, and he can make an arrest only when
he believes that a crime has already taken place.5 Although some
1. See Bogomolny, Street Patrol: The Decision to Stop a Citizen, 12 CRnm. L. BULL. 544,
558 (1976) (police perceive need for vagrancy laws). The removal of suspects from the area
of anticipated crimes disrupts criminal activities, and arrest prevents crime at least during
the time of confinement. See Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in
Need of Revision, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 557, 566 (1960). Courts have recognized the preventive
function of loitering and vagrancy laws. See City of Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wash. 2d 405, 412,
423 P.2d 522, 526 (1967) (en banc); cf. Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 313, 229 N.E.2d
426, 428, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 742 (1967) (stated justification for vagrancy laws "prevention
or control of crime"). In practice, however, arrests for these offenses has often degenerated
into mere harassment of those disliked by the police. See note 36 infra.
2. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
3. Id. at 162.
4. See, e.g., Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 428
U.S. 465 (1976); United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1974),
aff'd on other grounds sub norn. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975); People v.
Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 300 N.E.2d 411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1973); City of Bellevue v. Miller,
85 Wash. 2d 539, 536 P.2d 603 (1975) (en banc). Even before Papachristou, some courts
had invalidated such laws. See, e.g., Baker v. Bindner, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967);
Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967); City of Seattle
v. Drew, 70 Wash. 2d 405, 423 P.2d 522 (1967).
Faced with the difficulty of preventing street crime, police continue to resort to
vagrancy and loitering laws despite their doubtful constitutionality. In 1975 the police
made 40,000 arrests for vagrancy and 146,400 arrests for loitering and curfew violations.
They made an additional 36,200 arrests upon "suspicion." UNITED STATES FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, [1975] UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 179 (1976). An
arrest for suspicion permits detention and examination of the suspect by the police, after
which the suspect is released without formal charge. By comparison, there were 158,870
arrests for robbery in 1975. Id.
5. See p. 606 infra.
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criminal laws, including loitering laws sufficiently narrow to survive
the objections in Papachristou, do permit arrests for the first steps
toward other crimes, these laws are constitutional only when they
cover well-defined conduct.6 And the officer cannot make an arrest
under these laws unless his certainty about the suspect's guilt has risen
to the level of "probable cause."
Because of these limitations, criminal laws enforced through arrest
do not entirely satisfy the need for preventive measures. In Terry v.
Ohio," the Supreme Court approved police intervention short of arrest
when the need for intervention outweighs the invasion of personal
liberty.9 This approval of intervention short of arrest suggests a con-
stitutional method for preventing crime: under a narrowly written
statute, designed to restrict personal liberty as little as possible, the
police could order suspects to move on. In order to show the need for
such a statute, this Note will first review the preventive measures now
available to the police. It will then examine loitering and vagrancy
laws to illustrate the constitutional limits on preventive action by the
police and will argue that loitering and vagrancy laws sufficiently
narrow to meet constitutional requirements are inadequate to prevent
crime. It will propose instead a statute authorizing the police to give
orders to move on. Drafted to remain within constitutional bounds
and circumscribed by adequate remedies for abuses by the police, such
a statute would offer a means to prevent street crime without creating
arbitrary or ungovernable power.
I. Action by the Police to Prevent Crime
A police officer is charged with the duty not only to detect crime
but also to prevent it from occurring. 10 To carry out the duty of
prevention, the officer must interrupt suspicious activity before it
becomes completed crime. During the large amount of time that the
urban police officer spends on street patrol," his knowledge of the
area and of the people frequenting it will alert him to suspicious con-
duct that may represent the first stages of crime.
Consider two examples. A stranger follows a woman home and waits
6. See pp. 610-13 infra.
7. See p. 606 infra.
8. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
9. Id. at 21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37 (1967)).
10. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972) ("essence of good police work" may
be to respond when crime about to occur).
11. Cf. T. ADAMS, POLICE PATROL 2 (1971) (patrol is "most important single function
of the police department").
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outside on the sidewalk. After the police question the stranger, learn
his name, and radio to the police station, they discover that this person
was once convicted of indecent assault. Or suppose that several people
gather at night in a nearly deserted parking lot where a number of
muggings have recently taken place. The muggings have happened at
this time of night and have been committed by groups of several
people. When questioned by an officer, the people in the lot refuse to
identify themselves or to explain what they are doing.
Traditionally, the police could have forestalled the threat of crime
in such situations by making arrests for vagrancy or loitering 12 But
this means of intervention is no longer available to them. After
Papachristou and Terry, the police have four recognized constitutional
methods of dealing with what they regard as incipient crime: the
investigative stop, stop and frisk, arrest for inchoate crime, and arrest
for completed crime. When the officer has "reasonable suspicion" of
criminal activity, he can make an investigative stop for questioning.' 3
The officer does not need to believe that a crime "probably" has oc-
curred or is about to occur; he need only have an objective basis to
suspect criminal conduct.'4 In conducting the investigative stop, the
officer may request identification and an explanation of the suspect's
conduct.'3 If "specific and articulable facts" justify the suspicion that
a person is armed and dangerous, the officer may also conduct a
"frisk"-a limited external search for weapons.'( The Supreme Court
first recognized this power to stop and frisk in Terry v. Ohio.1 7 By
balancing the need for the police to act against the intrusion into
personal liberty, the Court found the stop and frisk reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.' The requirement of "specific and articu-
lable facts" assured that the stop and frisk would be objectively justifi-
able and reviewable.19
Arrest for either a completed or an inchoate crime must be based
12. See note 1 supra.
13. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881, 884-85 (1975). Government
agents had stopped a car to look for illegal aliens. The Court held the particular stop
unlawful because the only ground for suspicion was the Mexican appearance of the occu-
pants, but the Court would have allowed a stop based on "reasonable suspicion." Id. at
884-86.
14. Id. at 884-85.
15. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
16. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
17. Id. In Terry an officer observed that two men had repeatedly walked in front of
a store. Suspecting that the men were planning a robbery, the officer approached them
and questioned them about their conduct. When he received incoherent replies, the
officer frisked the suspects and discovered weapons. Id. at 5-7.
18. Id. at 21, 30.
19. Id. at 21.
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upon a greater degree of certainty. Under the Fourth Amendment,
only "probable cause" can justify an arrest or a search incident to
arrest.20 An officer has probable cause "if the facts and circumstances
known to [him] warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense
has been committed." 21 This standard makes arrest unlawful unless the
officer has substantial grounds to believe that a person has broken the
law.2--
By investigating suspicious conduct, the officer may gain probable
cause to believe that the person suspected of planning a crime has in
fact already committed one. The officer can then prevent further
crime by arresting the suspect for the completed offense and by remov-
ing him from the area. Even if the officer has not found probable
cause as to a completed offense, he may have grounds to arrest the
suspect for an inchoate crime,2 3 such as criminal attempt or possession
of burglar's tools. Since the laws on inchoate crimes reach only the
advanced stages of preparation for other crimes,24 however, they extend
in only a limited way the authority of the police to remove suspicious
persons from the area.
These methods alone-the investigative stop, stop and frisk, and
arrest for inchoate or completed crime-do not sufficiently enable the
policeman to discharge his duty to prevent crime. In the illustrations
above, questioning and frisking of the suspects might not reveal enough
information to ground probable cause. But because a reasonable sus-
picion that a crime was imminent would remain, the police would need
to act despite the absence of probable cause. Arrests for loitering or
vagrancy would once have allowed the police to intervene by removing
suspicious persons from the area of anticipated crimes, but the un-
20. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-02 (1959). The Court in dictum
recently reaffirmed this rule from Henry. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1975).
21. 361 U.S. at 102.
22. In Henry, for example, federal agents were investigating the theft of an interstate
shipment of whiskey. The agents had heard rumors that a friend of the petitioner was
involved in some sort of interstate shipment. When the agents saw the petitioner, who
had never before been suspected of crime, stop his car in an alley and pick up some
packages, the agents arrested him. The packages contained stolen radios. The Court
found that the petitioner's activity consisted of "acts that were outwardly innocent." Id.
at 103. Declaring that the agents lacked probable cause, the Court held the arrest un-
lawful and suppressed the evidence seized. See People v. Brown, 24 N.Y.2d 421, 424, 248
N.E.2d 867, 868-69, 301 N.Y.S.2d 18, 20 (1969) ('T]he detected pattern [of activity) . . .
does not provide probable cause for arrest if the same sketchy pattern occurs just as
frequently or even more frequently in innocent transactions.")
23. Crime is "inchoate" when the suspect has committed no completed offense, but
may be punished for steps leading toward a crime.
24. A classic case in the law of attempt, for example, is People v. Rizzo, 246 N.Y. 334,
158 N.E. 888 (1927), in which the defendant, who intended to rob the messenger of a
bank, rode in search of the messenger but failed to find him. The New York Court of
Appeals held that his actions did not amount to criminal attempt.
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constitutionality of loitering and vagrancy laws that served a general
preventive purpose leaves the police without an effective means of
intervention.
II. Papachristou and the Constitutional Limits on Laws Against
Vagrancy and Loitering
Laws against vagrancy and loitering permitted arrest when the
exercise of an officer's other preventive powers did not dispel the
suspicion that a crime was about to take place. An examination of
why courts have invalidated many of these laws illustrates the con-
stitutional limits on preventive action by the police, and a discussion
of loitering and vagrancy laws sufficiently narrow to meet these limits
demonstrates the need for an additional preventive measure.
A. Constitutional Limits
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,25 the Supreme Court held a
municipal ordinance proscribing vagrancy and loitering to be vague
and thus to constitute a denial of due process. In dictum the Court
implied that the ordinance violated the standards for search and seizure
of the Fourth Amendment as well, 20 and other courts have explicitly
held such laws in violation of that amendment.27 Loitering laws that
force a suspect to explain his presence and conduct or to face arrest
may also violate the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion.28
1. Due Process and the Doctrine of Vagueness29
Before states or the federal government can impose criminal penal-
ties, due process requires a clear specification of the prohibited con-
25. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
26. Id. at 169.
27. See, e.g., Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
428 U.S. 465 (1975); United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1173 (2d
Cir. 1974), af 'd on other grounds sub nor. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975).
28. See People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 574, 300 N.E.2d 411, 415-16, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33,
40 (1973); cf. California v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 437-38, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 872-73
(1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974) (dictum that law requiring more than identifica-
tion would violate Fifth Amendment).
29. In addition to the considerations to be discussed in this section-lack of fair notice
and the possibility of arbitrary enforcement-the doctrine of vagueness has another ele-
ment: the Supreme Court has been more willing to apply the doctrine when constitu-
tionally protected conduct might fall within the statutory prohibition. Note, The Void-
for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 75 (1960). See, e.g.,
Cramp v. Board of Educ., 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961) (state employees compelled to swear
that they had not supported Communist Party; problems of vagueness "aggravated" be-
cause law inhibited free expression).
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duct. 30 In Papachristou the Supreme Court identified two defects that
can make criminal laws void for vagueness. First, the laws may fail to
provide " 'fair notice' " of the forbidden conduct.3 ' Unless the legisla-
ture has drawn a clear line between permissible and impermissible
conduct, fear of punishment may lead individuals to refrain from in-
nocent activity.32 The Court has deemed it unfair to impose punish-
ment for activity that members of the public could not have known
to be forbidden and so did not avoid.33
Second, the Court in Papachristou condemned laws that delegate
excessively broad official discretion. When a law confers too much
discretion on the officer, it encourages "arbitrary and erratic arrests
and convictions ' 34 and allows police and prosecutors to attack conduct
that the legislature did not intend to forbid.35 Especially vulnerable
30. The Supreme Court may declare a civil statute void for vagueness as well. See
A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925) (statute prohibiting "un-
just or unreasonable" charges found vague). The doctrine has vitality, however, almost
exclusively in the criminal field. See Note, supra note 29, at 69 n.16. Because even civil
statutes may in theory be found vague, however, this Note will consider the doctrine of
vagueness in relation to the proposal advanced at pp. 618-19 infra, which creates only
a civil offense.
31. 405 U.S. at 162 ("This ordinance . . . 'fails to give a person of ordinary in-
telligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute' .
(quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954))).
32. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (law commanding state civil servants to
take oath). "The uncertain meanings of the oath require the oathtaker ... to 'steer far
wider of the unlawful zone' ... than if the boundaries of the forbidden area were clearly
marked." Id. at 372 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). Justice Holmes
expressed a similar idea in a civil tax case: "[T]he very meaning of a line in the law is
that you intentionally may go as close to it as you can if you do not pass it." Superior
Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1930). See H. PACKER, THE Listirs OF "re
CRIMINAL SANCTION 94-95 (1968). The vagueness doctrine guarantees that "no more power
[should] be given to call conduct into question as criminal, with all the destruction of
human autonomy that this power necessarily imports, than is reasonably needed to deal
with the conduct that the lawmakers seek to prevent." Id. This reluctance to direct
personal conduct grows out of classical liberal beliefs: "[F]ree scope should be given to
varieties of character, short of injury to others." J.S. 'MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Bobbs-Merrill
ed. 1956).
33. Justice Holmes once wrote:
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law
before he murders or steals .. . a fair warning should be given to the world in
language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if
a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should
be clear.
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931). McBoyle concerned strict construction of
a penal statute rather than vagueness, but such strict construction has been called "some-
thing of a junior version of the vagueness doctrine." H. PACKER, supra note 32, at 95. See
also Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393 (1926) (necessity of standard so
that persons can avoid prohibited acts).
34. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (citing Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937)).
35. See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (discussing improper delega-
tion; law against picketing declared vague); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (same;
law on inciting insurrection declared vague).
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are unpopular persons whom the police wish to harass- but cannot arrest
for any more precisely defined offense. 30 The police can enforce most
criminal laws selectively,37 but vague laws permit a different kind of
arbitrary action: they define the prohibited conduct so loosely that
the officer can decide for himself which acts violate the law.38
Loitering and vagrancy laws were useful in the prevention of crime
precisely because of their vagueness. The police officer could fit within
the expansive terms of these laws39 much of the conduct that might
signal the first stages of crime. Although vagrancy and loitering laws
allowed the officer to interrupt suspicious conduct by making arrests,
the laws failed to give adequate notice and insufficiently limited the
officer's discretion.
2. The Fourth Amendment and Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Vagrancy and loitering laws allowed the police to avoid the Fourth
Amendment requirement of probable cause for arrest. When these
laws prohibited "suspicious" activity, the officer needed only "probable
cause" to believe that conduct was suspicious. Since the officer's
"probable cause" consisted merely of his suspicion, he really had no
probable cause at all. 40 The Court in Papachristou found the require-
36. See P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER 232 (1969) (arrest of prostitutes for loitering);
Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 603, 631 (1956)
(arrest for loitering and vagrancy of "loafers," mentally ill, and those affronting dignity
of police).
37. See J. Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
38. See Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 428
U.S. 465 (1975).
39. The ordinance in Papachristou identified as vagrants all "rogues and vagabonds,
•.. common night walkers, . . . persons wandering or strolling around from place to
place without any lawful purpose or object. disorderly persons" and other misfits.
405 U.S. at 156 n.l.
Traditional notions of "loitering" and "vagrancy" are expansive and unspecific. To
loiter is "[t]o be dilatory; to be slow in movement; to stand around or move slowly about;
to stand idly around; to spend time idly; to saunter; to delay; to idle; to linger; to lag
behind." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1092 (4th ed. 1968). Vagrancy consists of "the act of
going about from place to place by a person without visible means of support, who is
idle, and who, though able to work for his or her maintenance, refuses to do so, but
lives without labor or on the charity of others." Id. at 1718. A Seattle ordinance made it
criminal for anyone "wandering or loitering abroad, or abroad under other suspicious
circumstances at night . . . to fail to give a satisfactory account of himself upon the
demand of any police officer." SEATILE CODE § 12.11.290 (cited in City of Seattle v. Drew,
70 Wash. 2d 405, 406, 423 P.2d 522, 523 (1967)).
40. See United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1173 (2d Cir. 1974),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). In Powell v.
Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 428 U.S. 465 (1975), the
court wrote: "A legislature could not reduce the standard for arrest from probable cause
to suspicion; and it may not accomplish the same result indirectly by making suspicious
conduct a substantive offense."
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ment of probable cause undermined even further because the suspicion
centered not on past but on "[f]uture criminality." 41 The use of arrest
to interrupt suspicious conduct thus conflicts with the Fourth Amend-
ment.
3. The Fifth Amendment and Self-Incrimination
Some loitering laws have authorized the police to demand that a
suspect explain his presence and conduct. 42 This demand presents the
suspect with a dilemma: by not answering, he may suffer arrest and
conviction for loitering; by complying with the demand, he may
provide the police with evidence leading to his arrest and conviction for
other offenses. These laws impose a criminal penalty for the suspect's
refusal to give information that might incriminate him. 43 The ordi-
nance challenged in Papachristou did not present this problem, and
the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue. But another court has
condemned a loitering law permitting an officer to demand an explana-
tion because of the burden placed on the right against self-incrimina-
tion under the Fifth Amendment. 44
The courts thus have found three basic constitutional limits on the
power of the police to intervene against suspicious conduct. Due pro-
cess requires fair notice of criminally prohibited conduct and demands
adequate limitations on the discretion of the police. Under the Fourth
Amendment, the police cannot make arrests without probable cause.
And the Fifth Amendment restricts the power to compel disclosures
from suspects upon pain of criminal sanctions.
B. More Precise and Limited Vagrancy and Loitering Laws
Loitering and vagrancy laws more precisely defined and limited than
the ordinance in Papachristou continue to come before courts. In
some instances these laws represent attempts to avoid the constitu-
tional problems of broader vagrancy and loitering laws.45 These more
41. 405 U.S. at 169.
42. See notes 60 & 61 infra.
43. The right against self-incrimination "demands that the government seeking to
punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors,
rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth." Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
44. People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 574, 300 N.E.2d 411, 415-16, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33, 40
(1973).
45. See State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104, 107 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975);
City of Bellevue v. Miller, 85 Wash. 2d 539, 543 nA, 536 P.2d 603, 606 nA (1975) (en banc).
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precise laws, however, either fail to satisfy the Constitution or are
ineffective in preventing crime.40
Some laws prohibit loitering that is supplemented either by other
conduct or by additional intent. When statutes forbid loitering in
combination with other conduct, such as carrying a concealed weapon,
courts have upheld the laws against charges of vagueness. By specifying
other conduct as an element of the offense, these statutes "give notice
as to what constitutes the unlawful conduct." 47 Since the element of
additional conduct clarifies what the legislature intended to forbid,
such statutes also reduce the danger of arbitrary enforcement.
The Fourth Amendment, however, demands that the arresting of-
ficer have probable cause of both the "loitering" and the other conduct,
since both elements are necessary to constitute the offense.48 When the
officer suspects a criminal plan but is not warranted in believing that
the suspect has committed the additional act,49 this type of statute does
not advance his ability to prevent crime.50
Other laws prohibit loitering committed with the "specific in-
tent""' to perform some other act, usually criminal in itself. The
46. These laws, discussed at pp. 611-16 infra, would not enable the police to intervene
in the examples hypothesized at pp. 604-05 supra.
47. Yuen v. Municipal Court, 52 Cal. App. 3d 351, 358, 125 Cal. Rptr. 87, 92 (1975).
The appellant in Yuen had been convicted under an ordinance of San Francisco that
defined an offense in terms reminiscent of the law in Papachristou. The law, however,
required an additional element for the offense: carrying a concealed weapon. According to
the California Court of Appeals this element was "a sufficient additional requirement to
give notice" of the forbidden conduct. Id. See People v. Smith, 393 N.Y.S.2d 239 (App.
Term 1977) (upholding N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.37 (West Supp. 1976), which requires
loitering supplemented by additional conduct of beckoning to. or stopping or interfering
with passers-by; intent to solicit prostitution also required).
48. The court in Yuen never discussed the details of the arrest. Unless courts delve into
the facts of arrests and searches, the statute lets the police circumvent even the require-
ments of the stop and frisk. Under the principles regulating stops and frisks, the police
officer may search the suspect only if he reasonably believes that the suspect is "armed
and dangerous." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968). Unless an external search discloses
an object that feels like a weapon, the officer may not reach into the suspect's clothing.
Id. at 29-30. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). Unless courts examine the facts
surrounding arrests more closely than the court in Yuen did, an arrest predicated on mere
loitering might enable the police to conduct a full search of the suspect.
49. The statute in Yuen, for example, would require probable cause to believe that
the suspect was carrying a concealed weapon. See pp. 605-06 supra (discussing probable
cause).
50. As a preventive measure, the statute in Yuen adds nothing to the stop and frisk.
The officer can frisk a suspect when he reasonably believes the suspect to be armed and
dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968). If the frisk uncovers a concealed weapon,
the officer can make an arrest under a different statute that forbids the carrying of such
weapons but does not require the element of loitering. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12025
(West Supp. 1977). Unlike frisks, searches under the statute in Yuen could be justified
only by probable cause and not by reasonable suspicion.
51. "Specific intent" refers to a "special mental element which is required above and
beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus [unlawful act] of the
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California Penal Code, for example, forbids loitering near a public
toilet "for the purpose of engaging in or soliciting any lewd or lasciv-
ious or any unlawful act." 52 The specific intent identified in this law
is a plan to commit the crime of soliciting or performing a lewd act.
Although one court has declared such a law void for vagueness, 3
prohibitions against loitering with intent to commit some other act
have usually withstood constitutional challenge. "4 These laws may
avoid vagueness because they limit the officer's discretion and give
notice to the individual. The officer can make an arrest only when the
acts or words of the suspect establish probable cause concerning the
necessary intent. And the individual has notice that he cannot plan
crimes and take actions toward realizing his criminal purpose. 55 Yet
these laws promise little help in the prevention of crime. When the
police officer only suspects the required intent, but lacks probable
cause, he cannot constitutionally remove the suspect from the area by
making an arrest.
Another approach is to forbid anyone to be in particular places, such
as parks and schools, at particular times. 56 Courts have sustained such
crime." W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 28, at 202 (1972). Just as burglary con-
sists of breaking and entering the home of another person at night with the intent to
commit some felony, see e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-102(a) (1977), so the loitering laws
considered here define an offense of loitering with intent to commit some other crime.
52. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(d) (West Supp. 1977). In People v. Ledenbach, 61 Cal. App.
3d (Supp.) 7, 132 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1976), the California Court of Appeal, without fully
engaging the constitutional problems, sustained this statute against an argument that the
provision was unconstitutionally vague. The court distinguished the ordinance in Papa-
christou on the grounds that the ordinance reviewed by the United States Supreme Court
made criminal "'activities which by modern standards are normally innocent.'" Id. at
10, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 644 (quoting Papachristou v. City of Jacksonvile, 405 U.S. 156, 163
(1972)). The California court interpreted the statute before it to require "linger[ing] for
the purpose of committing a crime." Id. at 10, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 644. The court never
answered the objection of inadequate notice. Even if the statute reaches only activities
that are not innocent, individuals have a right to know what particular conduct falls
within the statute.
53. See People v. Gibson, 184 Colo. 444, 521 P.2d 774 (1974) (en banc) (striking down
law against loitering with intent to solicit deviate sexual intercourse). An Oregon court
upheld an ordinance against loitering with intent to solicit prostitution only on the
interpretation that the law required conduct in addition to loitering and not just addi-
tional intent. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. D., 557 P.2d 687, 690 (Or. App. 1976).
54. See State ex rel. Williams v. City Court, 21 Ariz. App. 489, 520 P.2d 1166 (1974)
(loitering for purpose of begging); State v. Armstrong, 282 Minn. 39, 162 NAV.2d 357
(1968) (loitering with intent to solicit prostitution). See 1975 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 457 (discussion
of Williams). Courts in New York have often upheld such laws. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d
836, 842 (1969); 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 291, 300-03 (1973).
55. Although these laws may not specify the particular acts that will reveal a
criminal purpose, neither do laws on criminal attempt specify the particular acts in
furtherance of a criminal scheme that are necessary to constitute an attempt.
56. Similar are prohibitions against loitering near a school; such laws, though specify-
ing location, may not specify time. See, e.g., Anderson v. Shaver, 290 F. Supp. 920, 921
(D.N.M. 1968).
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laws." To avoid problems of vagueness, such a statute must create an
absolute proscription. By forbidding all persons to be in a particular
place at a particular time, the statute not only provides unambiguous
notice of the conduct prohibited but also guards against arbitrary en-
forcement. 5s
The police officer is primarily concerned with crime on streets and
sidewalks. A law could not, however, absolutely prohibit people from
being on streets and sidewalks. Yet if the prohibition established by
the law is less than absolute, problems of vagueness arise. Individuals
can be told not to "loiter" in a particular location at a specified time,
but they will not understand what conduct constitutes loitering any
more clearly under this kind of statute than under others not limited
by time or location. Nor would such a law eliminate the danger of
arbitrary enforcement, since it would leave unclear the conduct that
the legislature intended to forbid.59
A number of jurisdictions have enacted loitering laws based on a
proposal in the Model Penal Code. 0  The Code would forbid loitering
under "circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or
property in the vicinity."' 1 No suspect could be found liable under
57. See Peters v. Breier, 322 F. Supp. 1171 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (upholding ordinance that
prohibited anyone from being in certain public park during specified hours). The court
in Peters stressed that the ordinance applied only to a "small, localized area." Id. at
1172. More important, but unnoted by the court, was that the prohibition was absolute,
so that it did not invite arbitrary enforcement or leave any doubt about what conduct was
covered.
A similar method of escaping problems of notice, though not of arbitrary enforce-
ment, is to require all persons entering certain areas to obtain permission from designated
officials. See State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 87-90, 503 P.2d 176, 179-80 (1972) (permission
of school officials to be on school grounds).
58. The terms of the statute should clearly set out what conduct violates the law.
Only that conduct can justify an arrest.
59. The Supreme Court of Washington adopted this reasoning in State v. Martinez,
85 Wash. 2d 671, 538 P.2d 521 (1975). Martinez invalidated a statute that identified as a
vagrant every "[p]erson, except a person enrolled as a student in or parents or guardians
of such students or person employed by such school or institution, who without lawful
purpose therefor wilfully loiters about the building or buildings of any public or private
school .. or the public premises adjacent thereto ...." WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.87.010
(repealed 1975). The statute, ruled the court, did not afford fair notice of what conduct
it forbade; it encouraged arbitrary arrests; and it embodied an improper classification
(since teachers, exempted from the prohibition, might be as disruptive as anyone).
60. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 856.021 (1973); PORTLAND, ORE., CODE § 14.92.045 [date un-
known], quoted in City of Portland v. White, 9 Ore. App. 239, 240, 495 P.2d 778, 778-79
(1972); BELLEVUE, WASH., CITY CODE § 7A0.080 [date unknown], quoted in City of Bellevue
v. Miller, 85 Wash. 2d 539, 542-43, 536 P.2d 603, 605-06 (1975) (en banc). Another statute,
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(6) (McKinney Snpp. 1967), was "very like" a draft of the Model
Penal Code. See People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 573, 300 N.E.2d 411, 415, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33,
39 (1973).
61. The Code provides:
A person commits a violation if he loiters or prowls in a place, at a time, or in a
manner not usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant
alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity. Among the circumstances
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the Code if he undertook to "identify himself and explain his presence
and conduct" to the officer, provided that the explanation dispelled
alarm or "was true, and if believed by the peace officer at the time,
would have dispelled the alarm."0 2 Although the proposal in the
Code would subject violators to civil penalties only, jurisdictions enact-
ing laws based on the Code have imposed criminal sanctions.63
Courts have reached conflicting conclusions about the constitution-
ality of criminal laws similar to the Code.64 Some courts have found
that suspects cannot know what "circumstances ... warrant alarm for
the safety of persons or property"'  and that the laws, therefore, fail
to give fair notice. 60 In State v. Ecker,67 however, the Supreme Court
of Florida suggested a saving construction of such a law. To make an
which may be considered in determining whether such alarm is warranted is the
fact that the actor takes flight upon appearance of a peace officer, refuses to identify
himself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or any object. Unless flight by the
actor or other circumstance makes it impracticable, a peace officer shall prior to any
arrest for an offense under this section afford the actor an opportunity to dispel any
alarm which would otherwise be warranted, by requesting him to identify himself
and explain his presence and conduct. No person shall be convicted of an offense
under this Section if the peace officer did not comply with the preceding sentence,
or if it appears at trial that the explanation given by the actor was true and, if
believed by the peace officer at the time, would have dispelled the alarm.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). A "violation" under the
Code is subject only to civil penalties. Id. at § 1.04(5).
62. Id. at § 250.6.
63. See note 60 supra (citing laws).
64. Two courts have found laws based upon the Code to be unconstitutional. City
of Portland v. White, 9 Ore. App. 239, 495 P.2d 778 (1972); City of Bellevue v. Miller; 85
Wash. 2d 539, 536 P.2d 603 (1975). One court declared unconstitutional a law
resembling a draft of the Model Penal Code. People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 300 N.E.2d
411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1973). One statute somewhat similar to the Code has survived
through a narrowing construction. People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 867 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). Another statute following the Code was
upheld outright. State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
65. See note 61 supra (quoting Code).
66. New York, for instance, passed a statute that established a standard of "circum-
stances which justify suspicion that a person may be engaged or about to engage in
crime." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(6) (McKinney 1967). Ruling on this statute, the Court
of Appeals for New York found the standard "obscure" and held:
Assuredly, there are [sic] no commonly understood set of suspicious circumstances of
which all citizens are aware and to which applicability of the statute is restricted....
[This language] merely indicates that a person may be held for loitering if suspicion
of criminality happens to be created in the mind of the arresting officer.
People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 570, 300 N.E.2d 411, 413, 347 N.Y.S. d 33, 36 (1973).
Reviewing the same statute, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
noted that "[w]ith nothing more, the 'suspect' is hardly offered a bright line test for
distinguishing the licit from the illicit." United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492
F.2d 1166, 1173 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd on other grounds sub nor. Lefkowitz v. Newsome,
420 U.S. 283 (1975). Other courts, dealing with similar statutes, have voiced the same
objections. See Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
428 U.S. 465 (1975); City of Bellevue v. Miller, 85 Wash. 2d 539, 544-45, 536 P.2d 603, 607
(1975) (en banc).
67. 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
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arrest, the court held, the police officer must be able to articulate
"circumstances where peace and order are threatened or where the
safety of persons or property is jeopardized."' s An officer able to meet
that requirement would know "specific and articulable facts" justifying
an inference that public safety was in danger-a standard similar to that
approved in Terry v. Ohio for the stop and frisk. 9 Reading the
standard of "specific and articulable facts" into the statute, the Florida
Supreme Court dismissed the argument that the law was vague.7 0
The court's construction does not resolve the constitutional dif-
ficulties posed by the doctrine of vagueness. By requiring the police to
base arrests on specific facts demonstrating a threat to public safety, a
statute based on the Code may confine arbitrary enforcement. But the
problem of fair notice remains. The standard of guilt is defined by the
officer's state of knowledge, and individuals can know what is forbid-
den only if they can predict what conduct and what surrounding cir-
cumstances would alarm a trained and experienced officer.7 1
Nor could a court escape from the failure of notice by adopting as a
standard what would alarm a reasonable person. Such a standard would
preclude the police officer from taking into account any surrounding
circumstances known to him but not to the public, such as the pattern
of crime in the area.7 2 A criminal law aimed at prevention of crime
68. Id. at 109.
69. Id. at 109 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
70. Id.
71. If the Model Penal Code were enacted without change, the law would provide only
for civil sanctions. Arguably, a civil statute escapes problems of vagueness altogether,
since the Supreme Court has invoked the doctrine almost exclusively against criminal
laws. See note 30 supra. This Note assumes that civil laws directed against suspicious
behavior must meet the requirements of the vagueness doctrine: like criminal laws, civil
statutes providing for arrest are likely to inhibit innocent conduct unless the prohibition
is clear. The doctrine of vagueness protects against that inhibition. See p. 608 supra; cf.
City of Bellevue v. Miller, 85 Wash. 2d 539, 543 n.4, 536 P.2d 603, 606 n.4 (1975) (en banc)
(even statute based on Code that created civil violation would be tested for vagueness).
But even if a civil statute evaded the doctrine of vagueness, the proposal in the Model
Penal Code would be objectionable for policy reasons. See note 103 infra.
72. The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that in making investigative
stops, the police officer can take into account the pattern of crime in the area. See
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30
(1968) (observations by officer that justify stop and frisk may be evaluated "in light of
his experience").
A more likely method of rescue from the constitutional difficulties of the Model Penal
Code lies in the provision that protects from prosecution any suspect able to "identify
himself and explain his presence and conduct" to the officer. See note 61 supra. In
People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 951 (1973), the California Court of Appeal upheld a statute like the Model Penal
Code on the construction that such a phrase in the statute required only identification.
As the California court argued, the officer's request for identification gave the suspect
notice of what activity was prohibited by law. Id. at 435, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 870-71.
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cannot both provide notice to the suspect and give full play to the
police officer's expert knowledge.
Criminal laws based on the Code may also violate rights against un-
reasonable search and seizure and self-incrimination. Although the
Fourth Amendment requires probable cause for an arrest, a police
officer acting under the Code could arrest a suspect whose only offense
was to have acted suspiciously and to have failed to dispel the sus-
picion.7 3 And by putting a suspect to the choice of explaining his
conduct or facing arrest, the Code may compel self-incrimination in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.7 4
73. See United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1173 (2d Cir. 1974),
a!f'd on other grounds sub nom. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). "Probable
cause" to believe that an individual has acted suspiciously and has not dispelled the
alarm amounts to a reasonable certainty that there is suspicion. But suspicion is a less
rigorous standard than probable cause. See note 40 supra.
The American Law Institute itself acknowledged, in the commentary to the forerunner
of § 250.6 of the Model Penal Code, that the Code might be altering the standard of
probable cause to arrest. It observed that the provision "authorizes arrest of persons who
have not given reasonable ground for believing that they are engaged in or have com-
mitted offenses. Alternatively, it can be regarded as a legislative determination that in
.suspicious' circumstances, failure to respond to police inquiries supplies reasonable
ground." MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.12, Comment at 60 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
Unlike statutes against loitering with specific intent to commit a crime, see pp. 611-12
supra, the Code does not require the officer to have probable cause concerning the
suspect's intent.
74. In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), the Court overturned the con-
viction of a gambler for failure to register for and pay the wagering tax. The Court
reasoned that registration and payment would have entailed "'real and appreciable'"
dangers of self-incrimination. Id. at 48-49 (quoting Regina v. Boyes, 121 Eng. Rep. 730,
738 (Q.B. 1861)). A law creates a "real and appreciable" danger of self-incrimination if it
is directed at a "highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities" in an
area of the law "permeated with criminal statutes." Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965).
It is not beyond dispute whether, under Marchetti and the cases like it, a criminal law
based on the Model Penal Code violates the Fifth Amendment. In Marchetti and similar
cases, the act of giving any information at all was substantial and perhaps conclusive
proof of a crime. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 61 (1969) (Marijuana Tax
Act); cf. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 96 (1968) (although possession of some
weapons covered by registration act was legal, registration would, in vast majority of
cases, establish possessory offense under state or federal law; Fifth Amendment privilege
held valid defense to prosecution). Persons asked to explain their presence under the
Model Penal Code, on the other hand, are less likely to incriminate themselves, and in
any event the very act of answering the officer will not ordinarily provide substantial
proof of a crime.
Criminal laws based on the Model Penal Code nonetheless impose great burdens on
the right against self-incrimination. Since only those whose conduct gives warning of
possible criminality would have to explain themselves, the laws are directed at a "highly
selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities." The legislative purpose is not
regulatory but criminal, since laws based on the Code aim squarely at the apprehension
of criminals and potential criminals. The laws thus operate in an area "permeated with
criminal statutes."
The breadth of the information demanded-an explanation of presence and conduct-
poses another threat to rights under the Fifth Amendment. In California v. Byers, 402 U.S.
424 (1971), the Supreme Court did uphold a statute that required drivers involved in
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III. Orders to Move On: A Proposal
Loitering laws sufficiently broad to cover the examples in Part I
fail to satisfy the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 and
the laws that do survive the constitutional tests fail to cover the ex-
amples.70 A statute authorizing orders to move on would supply a
constitutional and effective alternative to loitering and vagrancy laws.
Although the police already issue orders to move on, 7r the power to
give these orders rests upon uncertain legal authority. Some existing
statutes could be read to authorize orders to move on as preventive
measures against street crime,78 but courts have fully considered orders
accidents to report themselves to the police. But although the driver whose conduct has
been criminal need supply only the information that he has been in a particular ac-
cident, the suspect under the Model Penal Code must give an account of his activities
sufficiently complete to dispel suspicion. Failure to do so is an element of a criminal
offense, since the jurisdictions adopting the provision from the Model Penal Code have
chosen to enact it as a criminal law. See note 61 supra (Model Penal Code itself proposes
civil sanction).
A forced explanation may also violate' the Fourteenth Amendment for reasons of
vagueness, since the power to demand an account might lend itself to arbitrary enforce-
ment. At least initially, the police officer must decide whether the suspect's account is
credible. The authority to make that decision may give the officer an arbitrary power to
arrest. See Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 428
U.S. 465 (1976); People v. Berck, 32 N.Y.2d 567, 571-72, 300 N.E.2d 411, 414, 347 N.Y.S.2d
33, 37-38 (1973). See Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment
of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police
Officers, and the Like, 3 CRIa!. L. BULL. 205, 223 (1967) (requirement of "reasonable
account" in vagrancy laws "operates simply as a charter of dictatorial power to the
policeman"). The courts in Powell and Berck did not consider whether the standards from
Terry erase this danger of arbitrary application. See p. 615 supra. But even if the
defect of vagueness could have been corrected, the Fifth Amendment would have stood
in the way of compelling more than identification.
75. See pp. 613-16 supra.
76. See pp. 611-13 supra. In neither example discussed at pp. 604-05 supra could
the police use a statute requiring both loitering and additional conduct that is well
enough defined to exclude innocent activity. In neither example could the police have
probable cause as to a criminal intent. And at least in the example in which the stranger
waits on the sidewalk, prohibitions limited by place would be inadequate.
77. See Council of Organizations on Philadelphia Police Accountability and Responsi-
bility v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1314 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Goode v. Rizzo,
506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); T. ADAMS, POLICE PATROL 7 (1971)
(citing police case report); J. RUBINSrEIN, CITY POLICE 231 (1973); Tiffany, Field Inter-
rogation: Administrative, Judicial and Legislative Approaches, 43 DENVER L.J. 389, 435-36
(1966).
Because these orders are largely unregulated, they are open to abuse. The police have,
for example, used orders to move on to harass prostitutes whom the police had insuf-
ficient evidence to arrest for any crime. P. CHEvIGNY, supra note 36, at 230.
78. The city of Jacksonville, Florida, has enacted an ordinance permitting orders to
move on when a suspect has failed to produce written identification. See Jackson v.
State, 319 So. 2d 617, 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). If the suspect does not produce
written identification, however, the officer need not limit himself to an order to move
on. Even before giving such an order and seeing whether the suspect obeys, the officer
can detain the suspect, take him to the police station, fingerprint him, photograph him,
interrogate him, and consult other police departments about possible outstanding war-
rants for his arrest. Id. at 617-19.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has upheld a statute allowing orders to move on.
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to move on only in the context, of demonstrations, major public dis-
orders, or obstruction of public ways.79 The proposed statute would
bring orders to move on into the open. It would explicitly grant
authority to issue these orders and would provide an effective method
for preventing crime. But it would limit that authority to satisfy the
Constitution and would regulate the conduct of the police.
A. The Proposal"0
A statute should authorize a police officer to issue an order to move
on when he knows specific and articulable facts warranting "alarm"
that a suspect will imminently commit a crime."' The statute should
specify some necessary elements of alarm: it might, for example, re-
The court sustained a loitering law because there had to be a "refusal to obey a police
order to move on before a charge under the ordinance [could] be prosecuted." Camarco v.
City of Orange, 61 N.J. 463, 466-67, 295 A.2d 353, 354 (1972) (decided before Papachristou).
The opinion by the intermediate court in Camarco, on which the New Jersey Supreme
Court relied, urged that the provision for an order to move on defeated any claim of
unconstitutionality raised against the ordinance. But the court did not elaborate a
rationale for that conclusion. II1 N.J. Super. 400, 407, 268 A.2d 354, 358 (1970).
One commentator, see Comment, Louisiana Vagrancy Law-Constitutionally Unsound,
29 LA. L. REv. 361, 378-79 (1968), proposed a law under which an officer could not issue
an order to move on without "probable cause to believe that the actor is about to commit
a criminal act against persons or property." If this "probable cause" implies the same
level of certainty as probable cause to arrest, see pp. 605-06 supra, an officer would not
be able to act in instances like those hypothesized at pp. 604-05 supra.
The proposed comprehensive revision of federal criminal law, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977), includes a section entitled "Failing to Obey a Public Safety Order," id. at
§ 1861, which authorizes orders to move on. But the orders can be given "in response to
a fire, flood, riot, or other condition that creates a risk of serious injury to a person or
serious damage to property." Id. at § 1861(a). If "other condition" is read in pari materia
with "fire, flood, [and] riot," the provision does not reach street crime at all.
79. One law in New York, for example, by its terms could authorize orders to move on
as preventive measures against crime. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20(6) (McKinney 1967)
(amending N.Y. PENAL LAW § 722(3) (Penal Code 1909)). The most extensive analysis of
this statute, however, concerned the First Amendment. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315
(1951). When an order under the statute arose arguably in the context of preventing
street crime, the Court of Appeals did not examine closely the justification for the order
but allowed the order on the ground that it was not "'purely arbitrary.'" People v.
Todaro, 26 N.Y.2d 325, 328-29, 258 N.E.2d 711, 712-13 (1970) (quoting People v. Galpern,
259 N.Y. 279, 284-85, 181 N.E. 572, 574 (1932)).
For analyses of orders to move on in contexts other than prevention of street crime,
see Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965) (civil rights picketing), and
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (civil rights demonstration).
80. For a suggestion that the order to move on could replace vagrancy and loitering
laws as a preventive measure against crime, see ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN
POLICE FUNCTION § 3.3(iv), Comment at 108-13 (Approved Draft, 1973). Although it is not
positively clear that orders to move on must rest on statutory authority, rather than the
kind of common law authority supporting the stop and frisk, the Supreme Court has
ruled that failure to obey the order of a police officer, however reasonable the order,
cannot constitute disorderly conduct in the absence of a statutory provision about such
disobedience. Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112 (1969). Because Gregory concerned
free expression, however, its application to prevention of street crime is uncertain.
81. The standard of "alarm" comes from the Model Penal Code. See note 61 supra.
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quire that the suspect be found acting in a manner and waiting at a
time and place unusual for law-abiding persons.8 2 Other circumstances
that would contribute to a finding of alarm would be the suspect's
failure to identify himself or an attempt to conceal himself or any
object. Orders to move on would be authorized only when the officer
could anticipate a particular offense. The statute should prescribe that
the anticipated crime present a serious danger to persons or property.
The statute should provide suspects actually engaged in innocent
activity an opportunity to dispel alarm. When the officer is alarmed by
a suspect's conduct, he should have to ask the suspect for an explana-
tion of his presence and conduct. If this explanation is credible and
sufficient to dispel alarm, the officer should have no authority to give
an order to move on.33 If the suspect's explanation is incredible or does
not dispel alarm, the officer could proceed to order the suspect to
move on. Such an order would specify the area to be avoided and the
duration of the order. The statute should prescribe a maximum area
and duration in which the order could be valid.
If the suspect disobeys a lawful order to move on, the officer would
have authority to bring the suspect to the police station. This authority
would carry out the purpose of removing potential criminals from the
scenes of anticipated crimes. Detention at the station should accord-
ingly not exceed the time during which the order to move on would
be valid, and searches of detained suspects should not exceed what
would be necessary to find concealed weapons.
The statute should also contain remedies for illegal orders to move
on.8 4 Individuals ordered to move on in violation of the statute should
be able to collect liquidated damages, as specified by the statute, against
the municipality, county, or state.
B. Constitutional Validity of the Proposal
The proposed statute conforms to the constitutional limitations that
general laws against loitering and vagrancy could not meet. Unlike
many of the current laws, the statute would not fail for vagueness. Be-
82. See id. Although the Model Penal Code requires loitering "in a place, at a time, or
in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals," id. (emphasis added), an unusual
hour by itself seems unlikely to support alarm.
83. Although this provision may appear unconstitutional when analogized to similar
provisions in loitering laws, see p. 616 supra, the Note argues that such a provision in
this context satisfies the Constitution. See pp. 625-26 infra.
84. An officer intent on harassment may find an illegal order quite as useful as a
legal one. The individual is likely to obey even an illegal order, and if he disobeys he can
vindicate his disobedience only after a possibly painful and costly trial. See note 77
supra (abuse of orders to move on).
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cause the substantive offense is a refusal to obey a lawful order to move
on rather than the creation of suspicion, the suspect receives fair notice
from the officer's order itself.sa Until he disobeys the order, no sanction
can be imposed on him. Arguably, the suspect unaware of the cir-
cumstances giving "alarm" still lacks notice, since he cannot know
whether the order to move on is lawful. But in an analogous case, a
person subjected to a lawful stop and frisk probably cannot refuse to
submit to that intrusion, even if he does not know the basis for the
officer's "reasonable suspicion."86 If a person resists either a stop and
frisk or an order to move on, he does so at the risk that the interven-
tion, based on facts outside his knowledge, may prove to have been
lawful. In the case of an order to move on under the proposed statute,
a person believing that the order is unlawful does not need to take that
risk: he can instead obey the order and then file suit for liquidated
damages.8 7
Susceptibility to arbitrary enforcement, like inadequate notice, can
make a law void for vagueness. The proposed statute would guard
against arbitrary enforcement by setting strict limits on the officer's
authority to give the order. Only in exigent circumstances, when the
officer felt "alarm," could the order be issued. Because the standard
of "alarm" imports an element of immediacy, the police officer would
need articulable reasons why he thought a crime was imminent. 88 The
85. The California Court of Appeal has made a similar argument. In the statute
before the court, the substantive offense was failure to give identification. See People v.
Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974);
note 72 supra (discussing case).
The Supreme Court of Florida may have been moving toward a similar argument in
State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975). The court
read into a loitering law the provision that a suspect obeying the "orders of the law
enforcement officer necessary to remove the threat to public safety" could not be con-
victed. Id. at 110. But this interpretation appeared in the section of the opinion dealing
with arbitrary enforcement rather than with fair notice. And as one commentator has
noted, the court did not describe what circumstances would justify such orders. See 4
FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 146, 158 (1976).
86. Suppose a person subjected to a stop and frisk mistakenly believes the intrusion to
be illegal and so resists the officer. Evidently, no case has decided whether resistance
could be excused by a mistaken belief that the stop and frisk violated the law, but two
commentators have implied that it could not. Chevigny, The Right to Resist an Un-
lawful Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 1128, 1142 (1969); LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Con-
stitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 125 n.438 (1968). If,
however, a court did find that suspects would lack adequate notice as to lawfulness of
the orders, the proposed statute could be amended so that the officer would briefly re-
count to the suspect his reasons for alarm before he ordered the suspect to move on.
87. See pp. 621-22 infra.
88. It has been disputed whether the term "alarm" in the Model Penal Code estab-
lishes a specific standard. Comment, supra note 78, at 377-78. The term takes on mean-
ing, however, when it is treated as a gradation of cause similar in kind to the "reason-
able suspicion" of stop and frisk. A standard of "alarm," because of its connotation of
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officer could not rely on a generalized apprehension of criminal activity
but would have to be alarmed about the possibility of a particular
crime.80 Adding another safeguard against harassment, the statute
would prescribe that the anticipated crime present a serious danger
to persons or property.90
Effective remedies would assure that the officer observed these
statutory limits. If the officer exceeded his statutory authority, a person
whose statutory or constitutional rights had been violated could recover
immediacy, is even stricter than "reasonable suspicion." See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40, 73 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (intrusion by police more easily justified when
situation demands immediate action).
89. In this regard, the proposal creates more rigorous standards than govern the in-
vestigative stop, another intrusion short of arrest. Courts do not always insist that
investigative stops be based on suspicion of particular crimes. See People v. Rivers, 42 Mich.
App. 561, 202 N.W.2d 498 (1972) (investigative stop of persons in "suspicious car"). But
see In re Herman S., 79 Misc. 2d 519, 520, 359 N.Y.S.2d 645, 647 (Fam. Ct. 1974), where
the court noted: "it seems clear that the [New York] stop-and-frisk law [involved in
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)] envisages a reasonable suspicion of a particular
crime" (emphasis in original).
90. Note the suggestion that Justice Harlan would have restricted the stop and
frisk to certain serious crimes, especially crimes of violence, in LaFave, supra note 86, at
65. But see Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (stop and frisk permitted in narcotics
case after informant tells officer that suspect is canying gun). Professor Amsterdam has
remarked that a great danger in the power to stop and frisk is that the police will assert
their authority to search for drugs. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 438 (1974).
Arguably, the proposed statute lends itself to a different type of harassment as well-
harassment of persons exercising First Amendment rights. The police have sometimes
used orders to move on in attempts to censor the expression of ideas or to hector groups
exercising a right of assembly. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Shuttles-
worth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
If this threat is real, a court might either look more favorably on arguments of vagueness,
see note 29 supra, or invoke the doctrine of overbreadth.
Under the doctrine of overbreadth, even a defendant charged for conduct unprotected
by the First Amendment can argue that "the statute's very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." Broad-
rick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). See generally Note, The First Amendment
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844 (1970). A statute is overbroad if its terms
would substantially cover protected speech, so that individuals might be inhibited in
exercising First Amendment rights. 413 U.S. at 612-13. In Broadrick the Supreme Court
announced a policy of caution toward the invocation of the overbreadth doctrine against
"ordinary criminal laws." Id. at 613. For a court to invalidate a statute regulating conduct
as well as speech, "the overbreadth of the statute must not only be real, but substantial as
well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Id. at 615.
Tested as if it were a criminal statute, the law proposed here is plainly intended to
cover only conduct unrelated to demonstrations, speeches, and other expression. Because
the officer must give each individual an opportunity to explain his presence and conduct
and so dispel alarm, the police could not issue an order to move on to a large group. If
the police sought to order a speaker to move on, he could explain his presence and
conduct by saying that he was making a speech. Were the police to use the proposed
statute in these unintended situations, courts could either construe the statute as inap-
plicable or rule the statute unconstitutional as applied. Under Broadrick, the statute
could not be struck down merely because it might provide an excuse for some uncon-
stitutional action by the police.
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liquidated damages against the municipality, county, or state.91 The
award of these damages would encourage police departments to
regulate the conduct of officers so as to eliminate abuses.92
In judging whether statutes are unconstitutionally vague, courts are
inclined to invalidate laws whose enforcement arguably violates con-
stitutional rights in addition to the guarantee of due process.93 The
proposed statute, unlike loitering and vagrancy laws, does not violate
rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and thus is immune
from the courts' most exacting scrutiny.
Because an order to move on imposes a restraint short of arrest, such
an order does not require probable cause under the Fourth Amend-
ment.94 A person subjected to an order to move on, however, is de-
prived of his freedom to go where he wishes, and he may have to
abandon some legitimate activity he has planned. Although this re-
straint is less severe than arrest, it is a "seizure" of the person within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.9- As a seizure short of arrest,
91. If the police violate a person's Fourth Amendment rights, two methods of redress
are available at present. At a trial for criminal charges, the court may suppress the
evidence illegally seized. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). If, however, a violation of the Fourth Amendment does not
produce evidence that a prosecutor seeks to introduce at trial, the individual's only
recourse is a suit for damages. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971) (implied cause of action against United States for violation of
Fourth Amendment by federal agents). Such suits almost always fail. If an officer is
sued as an individual, he is likely to be judgment-proof; but even if the officer has
money, jurors are usually sympathetic toward him and reluctant to award damages. Be-
cause it is so difficult to show the actual damages required to underlie an award 'for
punitive damages, even an individual suing a government may not win a judgment
sufficient to deter future violations. And suits against state or local governments may not
overcome problems of sovereign immunity. Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment,
1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621, 691-95.
Providing for liquidated damages against the municipality, county, or state may sur-
mount these difficulties. See Levin, An Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule for Fourth
Amendment Violations, 58 JUDICATURE 74, 76 (1974). When a person proved a violation of
his rights under the Fourth Amendment or the proposed statute, he could recover the
liquidated damages from the government without having to prove any actual damages.
Liquidated damages would, therefore, circumvent the judgment-proof officer and avoid
the problem of showing actual damages. Because the government rather than the officer
would be liable, sympathy for the policeman would not bar recovery. And the statute
itself would waive sovereign immunity.
92. Liquidated damages, it has been argued, would help to induce police departments
to initiate internal reform. See Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen
the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 457,
464-65 (1978). This internal reform would work against the tendency of professional norms
of the police to overcome legal rules. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 727 (1970).
93. See Note, supra note 29, at 75.
94. On the stop and frisk, a restraint requiring less than probable cause, see Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968). But see Moore, Field Interrogation, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L. REV.
245, 270-71 (1969) (arguing that only probable cause can justify order to move on).
95. "Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves
'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of
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the order to move on must meet the standards of the Fourth Amend-
ment elaborated in Terry v. Ohio.D" The seizure must be reasonable: 97
the need for the seizure must outweigh the invasion of personal
liberty;9 8 that is, the intrusion must be justified both in its inception
and in its scope. 9a
On one side of this balance is the need for the seizure. The interest
served by the order to move on is the prevention of imminent crime.
Under the proposed statute, an officer could not give such an order
unless the need for it was pressing: the officer must suspect that a
particular, serious crime is about to occur, and the standard of "alarm"
ensures that the need for action is immediate.
Against this need must be weighed the extent of intrusion. An order
to move on removes a person from the area of an anticipated crime and
so restricts his freedom of movement. Since the order to move on is a
restraint short of arrest, the extent of intrusion from the order may
be compared to the intrusions in other seizures less severe than arrest-
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of the citizen may we conclude that a
'seizure' has occurred." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.6 (1968). See United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
96. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
97. Id. at 20. Some have suggested that a different mode of constitutional analysis
would control statutes that restrain movement in the streets. Such statutes, the argument
urges, demand "strict scrutiny" because they burden a "fundamental interest" in free
movement; once a court has chosen that standard of review, any regulatory measure such
as the proposed statute is likely to fall. Professor Amsterdam has contended that the
government can restrict freedom of movement on the streets only for "overwhelming
considerations of social policy" that would "override this 'preferred' individual [liberty]
entitled to uniquely stringent judicial protection." Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 214. See
Note, Locomotion, Liberty and Legislation, 32 MONT. L. REV. 279, 284 (1971).
The cases do not establish, however, that freedom of movement on the streets is a
fundamental liberty, deserving the "uniquely stringent judicial protection" accorded, for
instance, to freedom of speech. The cases do establish as a fundamental liberty the
freedom to move across state and national borders, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 630-31 (1969); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15 (1965); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
173-74, 177 (1941), but the holdings do not discuss local movement.
Individuals in a federal republic have a critical interest in being able to travel
between the states. But to extend that fundamental interest to movement on the streets
would mean that the state could not even burden local traffic in the absence of a
compelling state interest. Amsterdam would recognize as compelling such an interest as
the maintenance of order in an emergency, the assertion of the police power during
" 'flood, fire, or pestilence.'" See Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 214 (quoting Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1965)). Any regulations limiting the use of streets or sidewalks
would be tested by this elaborate constitutional apparatus. It would be a more moderate
accommodation of interests to adjudicate such regulations on grounds of reasonableness.
Although citizens do hawe a right to travel on their streets and sidewalks, courts should
not describe the limits of that right in the vocabulary of "fundamental liberties" and
"compelling interests."
98. "[There is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing
the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.'"
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
536-37 (1967) (bracketed words added by Court)).
99. 392 U.S. at 19-20.
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the investigative stop and the stop and frisk. The cases concerning these
restraints acknowledge that more compelling circumstances justify
greater invasions of liberty. For sufficient cause, an officer may not
only stop a suspect but frisk him.100 Some courts have gone farther
and have allowed an officer to extend the investigative stop in exigent
circumstances by transporting the suspect from the place where he is
first detained.' 0 ' Like such transportation, the order to move on im-
poses a relatively long and severe restriction on the suspect's freedom
of movement. And like transportation, the order to move on is justi-
fied by exigent circumstances: the proposal sanctions orders to move
on only if there is "alarm." Justified by these exigent circumstances,
the intrusion of an order to move on is reasonable. The proposal would
grant only as much power as is necessary to dispel alarm that a suspect
is about to commit a serious crime. It would permit only the removal
of the suspect from the area.
Even if the suspect refuses to move on, the seizure is strictly limited
100. Id. at 27.
101. In United States v. Lee, 372 F. Supp. 591 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd nzern., 505 F.2d 731
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 933 (1975), the manager of a bank observed two men
hiding behind a nearby building. Since it was payday at a Westinghouse plant near the
bank, couriers would be bringing paychecks from the plant to the bank in order to cash
them and then would return to the plant with the money. These couriers would pass by
the place where the two men had hidden themselves. When the police chief came in
answer to the manager's call, he was able to grab Lee, who was one of the men. Telling
Lee that he wanted to talk to him, the officer put Lee in the back seat of the patrol car
and began to chase Lee's companion. Lee was later convicted for violation of federal laws
concerning firearms. Id. at 592-93. The court held:
The Chief was alone and confronted by two individuals whose conduct gave rise to
a well-founded suspicion that they were contemplating a daylight robbery of either
the bank or a courier[;] the obvious exigencies of this situation authorized the Chief
by a show of authority and limited physical force to temporarily seize the defendant
and restrain his freedom of movement by placing him in the back seat of the cruiser
until the situation had stabilized and he could determine if a full custodial arrest
and further detention were necessary.
Id. at 593. Had the officer not discovered firearms, the restraint in this case might have
occupied less time than the restraint from an order to move on. In one sense, however,
the imposition on freedom of movement was even greater than from such an order: the
officer forced Lee to go to a particular place-wherever the car was going. Here, as with
an order to move on, the policeman did not suspect that any crime had yet taken place.
Accord, In re Lynette G., 54 Cal. App. 3d 1087, 126 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1976) (transportation
across half block for identification by injured victim); People v. Courtney, 11 Cal. App.
3d 1185, 90 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1970) (removal of suspect to police station for questioning
when crowd gathered at scene of initial detention; no past crime suspected); State v.
Watson, 165 Conn. 577, 345 A.2d 532 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974) (transporta-
tion to police station when crowd gathered at scene of initial detention); People v.
Rivers, 42 Mich. App. 561, 202 N.W.2d 498 (1972) (suspects taken into building to verify
explanation of presence; no past crime suspected); cf. People v. Harris, 15 Cal. 3d 384,
540 P.2d 632, 124 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976) (transportation
for identification held unreasonable in particular case, but court explicitly refuses to hold
investigative transportation always unreasonable). But see Robinson v. United States, 278
A.2d 458, 459 (D.C. 1971) (implying that transportation would not be permitted when
original stop is for preventive purposes).
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to the need for removing the suspect from the area. The police can
detain the suspect only for as long as the order to move on would have
been valid, and the search incident to this detention cannot exceed what
is necessary to find weapons. 10 2 This detention does not attach the
stigma of a criminal penalty.103 The intrusion would be " 'strictly tied
to and justified by' ",104 the circumstances requiring the police to act.
The proposal would also meet the strictures of the Fifth Amendment
against compelled self-incrimination. Although a suspect's silence could
contribute one element to the justification for an order to move on,
the burden on rights under the Fifth Amendment is too indirect to
invalidate the statute. In Baxter v. Palmigiano,'0 5 the Supreme Court
approved the drawing of an adverse inference from a person's silence,
when that inference was only one of the grounds for imposing a
burden other than a criminal penalty.10 6 Under the proposal, the
102. For the broad powers at common law to conduct a search incident to arrest, see
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that lawful custodial arrest
for minor crimes conferred on arresting officer authority to make full search of suspect's
person); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265 (1973) (same). Although the proposal
would limit the extent of a search incident to an arrest for disobeying an order to move
on, the same result might possibly be reached through judicial construction. A court
interpreting the proposed statute might, despite Robinson and Gustafson, limit the ex-
tent of a search incident to arrest, since the suspect arrested is subject only to civil
penalties. Cf. State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974) (despite Robinson state
constitution limits warrantless search even of incarcerated person to scope necessary for
discovery of weapons or of fruits or instrumentalities of particular crime). See also
Zehrung v. State, 22 CRim. L. REP. (BNA) 2080 (Alaska Sept. 30, 1977) (state constitution
forbids full search without warrant when person arrested will be permitted to post
immediate bail); People v. Maher, 17 Cal. 3d 196, 198, 199, 550 P.2d 1044, 1046, 1047, 130
Cal. Rptr. 508, 510, 51-14 (1976) (en banc) (state constitution forbids full search incident
to arrest for public drunkenness, if person arrested to be released immediately on bail).
The proposal follows the American Law Institute, which has recommended a statutory
limitation on searches incident to arrest for minor offenses, including civil violations.
ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 230.2 (1975).
On the reasonableness of arrest in civil rather than criminal cases, compare Logan v.
Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Conn. 1972), aff'd mnemn. sub norn. Briggs v. Arafeh, 411
U.S. 911 (1973) (detention in emergency for psychiatric treatment).
103. The Model Penal Code, too, would impose only civil sanctions. The statute
proposed here, however, is preferable because its sanction is less intrusive. The suspect
giving alarm under the Model Penal Code can be arrested. See note 61 supra. If a
suspect creates alarm under the statute proposed in this Note, he is initially subject to
an order to move on. Only if the suspect disobeys the order can he be detained.
104. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)).
105. 425 U.S. 808 (1976).
106. Palmigiano, a prisoner, had refused to testify before a disciplinary board that
was deciding whether to punish him for his alleged role in a disturbance inside the
prison. Although the state had not yet preferred criminal charges, Palmigiano's conduct
might well have exposed him to criminal liability. The disciplinary board warned
Palmigiano that it would draw an adverse inference from his silence, but he still refused
to testify. The Court upheld the adverse inference, noting that silence was not the only
ground for the punishment imposed. The Court distinguished a line of cases on uncon-
stitutional conditions by observing that in those cases the deprivations, such as denial of
government contracts, had followed automatically on the assertion of rights under the
The Yale Law Journal.
suspect's silence would reinforce alarm created by other circumstances
and conduct and would be "given no more evidentiary value than was
warranted."'107 Unlike some laws that have been enacted against loi-
tering, the proposed statute would not make silence an element of a
criminal offense.'08
Conclusion
The proposed statute would provide an effective means for the
prevention of crime. Reconsider the two examples in Part I. When an
officer questioned the suspect waiting outside the home of a woman
the suspect had been following, the officer discovered who the man
was and, on the basis of that identification, found that he had pre-
viously been convicted of indecent assault. Although the officer could
make no arrest, the proposal would permit an order to move on. If the
officer returned later and saw the suspect still outside the woman's
home, he could take the suspect to the police station. In the other
example, the failure of the suspects in the parking lot to offer identi-
fication or to explain themselves would contribute to alarm. Also con-
tributing to alarm would be the hour of night and the recurrence of
robbery in that location. An order to move on would deny to these
persons the location best suited to the criminal purposes that they may
harbor.
While permitting the police to act in these instances, the proposed
statute would not create in the police an arbitrary or excessive power.
It would, indeed, regulate the conduct of the police by defining the
limits of their authority and providing remedies for abuse of that
authority. It would serve the interests both of preventing crime and of
protecting individual liberty.
Fifth Amendment. Id. at 317-18. The idea that silence, if accompanied by other evidence,
can contribute toward probable cause for arrest is analogous. See ALL MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 120.1, Comment (1975).
107. 425 U.S. at 317-18.
108. Baxter did not change the standards for judging the constitutionality of im-
posing criminal sanctions for silence: "No criminal proceedings are or were pending
against Palmigiano. The state has not . . .sought to make evidentiary use of his silence
at the disciplinary hearing in any criminal proceeding." 425 U.S. at 317. Laws based on
the Model Penal Code, in contrast to the law proposed here, impose criminal penalties
partly because of the suspect's silence. See note 60 supra (citing laws). The law proposed
here would, in the event that the suspect is silent and that the circumstances give alarm,
impose only an order to move on. Although the Court in Baxter did not elaborate a
rationale for distinguishing criminal and civil sanctions, the Court may have considered
criminal sanctions as more heavily burdening the Fifth Amendment.
Baxter left undecided whether testimony given under threat of an adverse inference
from silence would be admissible at a later criminal trial. If such testimony were inad-
missible, the suspect's explanation of his presence and conduct, given under threat of
an order to move on, would also be inadmissible.
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